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Abstract
Blockchain technology has the potential to resolve
trust concerns in cross-organizational workflows and
to reduce reliance on paper-based documents as trust
anchors. Although these prospects are real, so is
regulatory
uncertainty.
In
particular,
the
reconciliation of blockchain with Europe’s General
Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) is proving to be
a significant challenge. We tackled this challenge with
the German Federal Office for Migration and
Refugees. Here, we explain how we used Action
Research to guide the Federal Office in creating a
GDPR-compliant blockchain solution for the German
asylum procedure. Moreover, we explain the
architecture of the Federal Office’s solution and
present two design principles for developing GDPRcompliant
blockchain
solutions
for
crossorganizational workflow management.

1. Introduction
Within organizational boundaries, centralized
workflow management systems have proven highly
effective at increasing efficiency and reducing costs
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[23, 37]. However, beyond these boundaries,
workflow management becomes challenging as
mutual distrust often prevents the delegation of
workflow governance to a central authority [23].
It has been proposed that the use of blockchain
technology could ease these trust concerns [27].
Blockchains are distributed databases that use peer-topeer protocols and cryptographic hash functions to
propagate and store data in a tamper-resistant and
consistent manner among the participants of a
blockchain network [5, 16]. These properties allow the
participants of a blockchain network to establish a
“shared truth” without the need for a central authority
[5].
Specifically, blockchain could increase the
transparency of cross-organizational workflows and
reduce the use of paper-based documents as trust
anchors [27]. Although these prospects are real,
regulatory uncertainties continue to hinder the
adoption of blockchain-based workflow management
[18]. These uncertainties include those arising from
Europe’s General Data Protection Regulation
(GDPR). The GDPR codifies several rights of data
subjects, such as the right to rectification and the right
to erasure of their data. Moreover, it demands
transparent responsibility for compliance with the

Page 4023

GDPR and bars processing of personal data without a
lawful basis.
These requirements conflict with several of
blockchain’s properties. In particular, the right to
erasure and rectification, and the GDPR’s requirement
that data controllers can be identified and held to
account, present challenges for blockchain-based
solutions [20].
In this paper, we argue that these conflicts can be
resolved through a combination of organizational
means and a three-layered architecture that enables
rectification and erasure. Our arguments draw on
learnings from our involvement in an ongoing
blockchain project with Germany’s Federal Office for
Migration and Refugees (BAMF), which seeks to
introduce a blockchain-based solution for the
management of Germany’s asylum procedure [13].
In particular, we outline what we learned in the
course of three Action Research (AR) cycles that we
used to guide the BAMF towards a GDPR-compliant
blockchain solution. We also discuss how the
architecture facilitates rectification and erasure of
personal data, and present two actionable design
principles for designing GDPR-compliant solutions in
general and for cross-organization workflow
management in particular.
The paper proceeds as follows: In section 2, we
provide theoretical background on blockchain
technology, the GDPR, and alternatives to reconcile
the two. In Section 3, we describe our use of AR and
the BAMF’s blockchain project. Section 4 details the
three cycles of our AR approach and discusses the
architecture. In Section 5, we present and discuss the
design principles we drew from the BAMF case.
Section 6 concludes.

2. Theoretical background
Blockchain technology offers an innovative
approach to data management. Instead of relying on a
single trustworthy keeper, blockchain networks
manage data by network consensus.
In many instances, this data is personal, i.e. it can be
used to identify a natural person. In the European
Union, processing of personal data has to comply with
the binding rules of the GDPR. Several of these rules
are challenging to meet, such as the need for clear
responsibilities in the blockchain network, the
establishment of lawful bases for processing, and the
observance of the right to rectification and erasure.

2.1. Blockchain
In 2008, Nakamoto [26] conceived blockchain as a
distributed digital ledger for Bitcoin transactions [3,
5]. Since these modest conceptual beginnings,
researchers and practitioners have added various
features, and developed blockchain-based solutions
for cross-organizational workflow management [14],
supply chain records [17, 25], security and privacy in
the context of the Internet of Things [10, 32], finance
and assurance [21], social business [33], and
governmental services, as for example in Estonia [24]
and Dubai [1].
Condos et al. [8] describe a blockchain as an
electronic registry for digital records, events, and
transactions, which is managed by the participants of
a distributed computer network. In conceptual terms, a
blockchain is a decentralized database that validates
and stores data in so-called blocks. Consensus
mechanisms order new blocks in an ever-expanding
chain in order to ensure integrity and tamperresistance [7, 29]. This chain is stored redundantly
with each participant (technically called ‘nodes’) in
the blockchain network, and new blocks are
propagated throughout the network via peer-to-peer
protocols [16].
From a more technical perspective, each block
contains validated and structured data, and integrity is
afforded by cryptographic hash functions. Appending
a new block requires the calculation of the hash value
of the data in the new block (𝑛) and the hash value of
the previous block (𝑛 − 1). As such, the hash value of
block 𝑛 includes the recursive hashes of all previous
blocks [33]. Consensus mechanisms allow the
blockchain network to agree on the validity and the
order of the data in a block, and the correct order of
the blocks [33]. Depending on the specific blockchain,
technology (e.g., Bitcoin, Ethereum, Hyperledger),
blockchain developers can choose from a variety of
consensus mechanisms, each of which provides a
different level of security and latency, and requires
more or less energy [7, 36].
Blockchain solutions may also differ in terms of
their assignment of read and write permissions
(permissioned vs. permissionless blockchains),
privacy
(public
vs.
private
blockchains),
centralization, and efficiency [7, 28, 36]. The BitcoinBlockchain is a typical example of a public,
permissionless blockchain. Each participant can
download the blockchain, read all transactions, submit
new transactions, and mine new blocks. In contrast, a
private blockchain allows only verified members to
see the stored data. Most private blockchains are also
permissioned. This means that the network can decide
who will become a new member and who can submit,

Page 4024

write, and read the information on the blockchain.
Because this control requires that the identities of all
network participants are known, a permissioned
blockchain is less anonymous. Hyperledger is a typical
example of a private, permissioned blockchain.

2.2. The General Data Protection Regulation
The GDPR standardizes the rules for the
processing of personal data by both private and public
data processors throughout the member states of the
European Union (EU). It aims to allow data subjects
to hold controllers and processors of their data to
account, and it enshrines privacy by design and by
default. At the same time, it aims to foster the free
movement of personal data across the EU member
states.
The GDPR applies to any act of processing any
information relating to an identified or identifiable
natural person in the EU, and to any such act by a data
processor operating in the EU. It builds on a range of
principles, as outlined in Article 5. Most importantly,
it outlaws any processing of personal data unless the
processor has a lawful basis, such as documented
consent by the data subject or if the processing is
required to meet contractual and legal obligations.
In particular, the GDPR strengthens the rights of
data subjects (Chapter 3, Articles 12-23 GDPR). These
rights include, among others, the right to rectification
(Article 16) and the right to erasure (Article 17) [15].

2.3. Reconciliation of blockchain with the
GDPR
Reconciling the processing of personal data
through a blockchain network and the demands of the
GDPR poses three essential challenges.
Firstly, the GDPR demands that responsibilities for
ensuring compliance are clearly identified and
designated, particularly when several parties jointly
control the processing of personal data. Establishing
these responsibilities is often not easy, especially if the
blockchain network is public and permissionless.
Secondly, the GDPR prohibits the processing of data
unless, among others, this has been explicitly
authorized by the subject or is required to fulfill
obligations under law or contract (lawfulness of
processing). However, establishing a lawful basis for
each act of data processing in a blockchain network
can be particularly cumbersome. The third challenge
is the reconciliation of the rights to rectification and
erasure with blockchain’s premise of tamper-resistant
on-chain storage. From a legal perspective, these

challenges could be addressed using three different
approaches [12]:
First, in the "central authority" approach, the
network nominates a central authority. This authority
may consist of a single participant of the blockchain
network or a group of participants. The central
authority assumes responsibility for compliance with
the GDPR, establishes rights of network participants,
and creates legal agreements for data processing with
the nodes. The authority also secures the lawful bases
for data processing and handles any related matters. If
the blockchain network only processes the personal
data of network participants, the central authority
would have to create contracts with each network
participant. If the network processes the personal data
of third parties, the central authority must also secure
the lawful basis for the processing of said third party
data.
The right to rectification can be observed by
submitting a rectification transaction to the
blockchain. The right to erasure of personal data is
waived by way of contract between the central
authority and the network’s participants, and affected
third parties if necessary. In case any of these contracts
become void, the blockchain may have to be modified.
Second, in the “shared responsibility” approach, all
participants in the blockchain network jointly assume
responsibility for GDPR compliance. The lawful basis
for the processing of personal data relating to network
participants and/or third parties is ideally assured
through mutual contract. As in the “central authority”
approach, the right to rectification is observable
through rectification transactions, and the right to
erasure is waived by way of contract. Again, any of the
contracts becoming void can require the modification
of the blockchain.
Third, in the "pseudonymization" approach, data
on the blockchain is pseudonymized so that it only
qualifies as personal data to those participants who
possess certain additional information that allows
attribution of the data to a natural person. Only those
participants who possess the additional information
required for attribution are controllers. When these
controllers jointly determine the purposes and means
of processing the pseudonymized data and the data
required for attribution, they are joint controllers. At
this point, they need to establish, through a joint
control arrangement, their respective responsibilities
for compliance with the GDPR and for establishing
lawful bases for data processing. Otherwise, they can
create data processing agreements to establish clear
responsibilities for compliance. They can uphold the
right to rectification through rectification transactions
and the right to erasure by eliminating the additional
information – that is, by depriving themselves of the

Page 4025

ability to attribute data to specific individuals. As
such, the “pseudonymization” approach is
considerably less risky from a legal perspective but
requires a solution architecture which ensures that the
additional information required for attribution can be
securely shared and reliably eliminated.

3. Research approach
We chose a participatory action research approach
to guide the BAMF’s blockchain project. In particular,
we held frequent functional and technical workshops
to pinpoint problems, develop solutions, and foster
reflective understanding. We also participated in
developer, regular stand-up, and management
meetings.

3.1. Case description
In Germany, asylum procedures require close
collaboration and the exchange of information
between various organizations at the municipal, state,
and federal levels. Meanwhile, the exchange of certain
data still takes place using paper records, which, in
some cases, is still considered to be a more secure
method of information sharing.
Although various digitalization projects have been
effective in reducing paper-based communication and
have substantially increased the efficiency of
procedures, some of these projects have also
introduced new challenges. Most prominent among
these challenges is the management of the Central
Register of Foreign Nationals (AZR), Germany’s
centralized database of information on foreign
nationals in Germany. The AZR stores data on more
than 26 million foreign nationals and grants more than
14,000 authorities access to read and write in these
records.
The size of the AZR means that use often proves
cumbersome, especially when it comes to logging, and
informing users of data updates by other users.
Moreover, the AZR is vulnerable to data quality issues
because many updates are manual and many
authorities do not use the AZR as their primary
database. Although data security considerations are
paramount, the AZR’s centralized design translates
into elevated vulnerability against failure and attacks.
Legally, the AZR is bound to the provisions of a
detailed AZR law. While this law provides a solid
legal foundation, it also reduces the AZR’s flexibility
as many technical updates require a formal legislative
process.

These complexities have encouraged the BAMF to
explore a decentralized alternative for crossorganizational workflow management that would not
require the extension of the AZR. After a preliminary
evaluation, the BAMF narrowed down its
technological options and decided to evaluate the
prospects of blockchain technology in a Proof-ofConcept (PoC).
Over the course of the PoC project, the BAMF
created a blockchain prototype for a simplified asylum
procedure involving three authorities. The prototype
used blockchain to log and propagate the completion
of essential steps in the procedure. Moreover, an IT
provider working for the BAMF coded the simplified
asylum procedure into a smart contract to allow for
automated monitoring of the workflow and automated
triggering of subsequent process steps.
Based on their evaluation of this prototype, the
BAMF put forward a case for the broader adoption of
blockchain in the asylum procedure. This case rests on
the premise that Germany’s federal system severely
limits centralized governance of asylum procedures. In
particular, the German asylum procedure requires a
solution that minimizes the redistribution of control
and facilitates multilateral coordination.
Effective multilateral coordination, on the other
hand, requires new process logs to be swiftly
disseminated to all organizations so that each may
initiate coordinative actions as required. Blockchain
technology provides precisely this functionality and
allows participants in the blockchain network to work
with a “shared truth”. Moreover, the procedure’s many
cross-organizational handovers require a high degree
of data integrity. While blockchain cannot ensure the
accuracy of the propagated process logs, it can ensure
their consistency and availability for later process
forensics.
Based on these arguments, the BAMF decided to
advance its blockchain efforts and test the technology
in a pilot project. Due to the complexity of the German
asylum procedure, the BAMF limited the scope of its
pilot project to two authorities (the BAMF and the
Saxony’s central immigration authority (LDS),
Germany) and the AnkER procedure in Dresden,
Saxony. The AnkER procedure is a particular instance
of the German asylum procedure that clusters three
essential elements of the procedure at one facility in
order to increase efficiency: arrival (German:
Ankunft), decision (Entscheidung), and return
(Rückkehr). Figure 1 presents a schematic snapshot of
the AnkER procedure and illustrates the mutual
dependence of the BAMF and the LDS in managing
asylum applicants.
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Figure 1. Schematic view of the use of blockchain in the
pilot project

Although the BAMF had already emphasized privacyby-design in the prototype, the use of actual personal
data in the pilot required detailed consideration and
observation of the GDPR’s requirements.
The BAMF opted for a “pseudonymization” solution,
as it deemed the collection of waivers from all affected
third parties – that is, the asylum applicants –
practically and legally impossible. It thus drafted an
agreement with the LDS to set out the roles and
responsibilities for joint control, as required by the
GDPR. The BAMF also designed an architecture that
enables both the separate sharing of process
information required for effective cross-organizational
workflow coordination and the sharing of information
that allows the attribution of the process information
to an asylum applicant. In particular, the pilot’s
architecture involves the use of so-called privacy
services for the safe storage and exchange of the
information required for attribution – that is, the
mapping of a pseudonymous blockchain identifier to
the specific IDs in the authorities’ other databases.

3.2. Action research
The guidance we offered the BAMF followed an
AR approach. AR was first introduced by Lewin in
1946 [19] and describes a cyclical process to
investigate the organizational implications of
theoretically derived practices [4, 9, 22]. AR intends
that researchers cooperate with practitioners to
understand and solve organizational issues, report and
abstract the knowledge gained, and derive relevant
implications for theory and future research [31]. AR is
used in many contexts as organizational issues are
often complex and challenging to solve [2]. In contrast
to observational case studies, practitioners remain
continuously aware of the presence of the researcher,
who actively engages in the role of a consultant or
organizational member, for example, by developing
models and methods or giving decisive advice based
on knowledge and theories relevant to practice [2, 4,

31]. Consequently, AR generates practical as well as
theoretical outcomes.
Rapoport [30] and Evered [11] describe AR as an
iterative five-stage cycle. Each cycle starts with the
identification or definition of the problem (stage one,
diagnosing). In a second step, the researcher creates a
plan involving specific actions which will mitigate or
solve the identified problem (stage two, action
planning). In creating the plan, the researcher employs
a theoretical framework which should explain why and
how the planned actions will bring forth the desired
change. Subsequently, at least one of the actions
planned in stage two is executed (stage three, action
taking). Upon execution, the researcher analyzes the
consequences of the action and considers whether the
action has had the intended effect (stage four,
evaluation). In the last step, the researcher identifies
general findings from stage four and communicates
these findings to allow the resolution of the problem at
hand and similar problems in other contexts (stage
five, specifying learning). After performing stages one
to five, the next cycle starts with stage one again.
Typically, researchers traverse the AR cycle at least
twice so that learning from the first cycle can be
implemented in the action planning, action taking, and
evaluating phases of the second cycle.
Following Yang et al. [34], we used a simplified
AR approach with three cycles each involving three
stages. In this simplified approach, stage one identifies
and explains the problem (problem) whereas stage two
(intervention strategies) combines the stages action
planning and action taking, and stage three (reflection)
combines the stages evaluation and specifying
learning.
In each cycle, we had a different focus. In cycle
one, we conveyed the importance of privacysensitivity in designing the prototype’s architecture. In
cycle two, we encouraged a detailed legal analysis in
order to evaluate the prototype’s compliance with the
GDPR. In cycle 3, we aided the BAMF in creating a
fully GDRP-compliant solution.
Empirically, we based the problem analysis and
reflection stages on a rich set of 19 semi-structured
interviews with BAMF stakeholders and external
blockchain experts, five workshops, several informal
discussions, two expert reports, direct observations, as
well as on secondary documentation.

4. A GDPR-compliant blockchain
solution for the German asylum
procedure
We conducted cycle one of our three action
research cycles during the first half of the PoC, and
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cycle two spanned the latter half of the PoC. We began
cycle three with the start of the pilot.

4.1. Cycle 1: Design of a privacy-sensitive
architecture
Problem: The German asylum procedure requires
many authorities and public organizations at the
municipal, state, and federal levels to collaborate
closely and exchange various information. Most of
this information is sensitive, and most of the data
processed in the course of the procedure are personal.
Moreover, switching between different media and
paper-based forms of communication is common. As
a result, information on procedure updates propagates
slowly, and the parties involved often lack a shared
level of information, which increases the risk of
substantial errors such as unlawful repatriation. In
order to address these issues, the BAMF had already
explored options for a cross-organizational workflow
system. This exploration process had established that
neither an extension of the AZR nor the introduction
of conventional workflow management with
centralized process governance would effectively
address the identified issues.
Intervention strategies: In a joint ideation
workshop with the BAMF, we evaluated whether
blockchain could be used to address the identified
challenges and provide a workflow coordination
solution for the German Asylum procedure. Based on
the positive results of this evaluation, we encouraged
the BAMF to advance its exploration to a PoC project.
Because of the sensitive and personal nature of many
of the data, we suggested that the BAMF should be
especially sensitive to data privacy.
During the PoC, the BAMF created a blockchain
prototype for a simplified asylum procedure. The
prototype used blockchain to log and propagate the
completion of essential steps in the procedure. In order
to foster privacy by design, we suggested that the
prototype should minimize the amount of information
stored on the blockchain, and preserve the data
sovereignty of individual authorities. The BAMF
heeded our advice and designed a three-layer
architecture that stored a minimum amount of
information on the blockchain (layer one – blockchain
layer) and relied on blockchain adapters for efficient
requests and off-chain sharing of data (layer two –
adapter layer). Only in response to certain triggers
would the blockchain adapters pull data from the
authorities’ databases and workflow management
systems (layer three – existing systems layer).
In particular, the adapters respond to specific
actions in the workflow management systems and

communicate the data / status changes to the
blockchain as events. Each event has a status, a timestamp, the ID of the authority that created the status
update, and the AZR ID of the asylum seeker
concerned. The adaptors submit these events to the
blockchain. Once stored on the blockchain, the events
can trigger the actions of a smart contract that allows
the automated monitoring of the workflow and the
automated triggering of subsequent process steps.
As the PoC emphasized data privacy, the BAMF
only worked with dummy data. Moreover, the BAMF
decided to use a private permissioned blockchain that
would allow fine-grained identity and access
management.
Reflection: The PoC demonstrated that a
blockchain could provide the essential features of
cross-organizational workflow coordination while
adhering to important privacy-by-design principles.
Moreover, a blockchain solution could maintain the
asylum
procedure’s
decentralized
workflow
governance and ensure that each authority maintained
guardianship over its data.

4.2. Cycle 2: Detailed analysis of GDPRcompliance
Problem: During cycle 1, the BAMF focused
primarily on the technical feasibility of a blockchain
solution that was both effective and privacy-sensitive.
However, the BAMF had designed its prototype
without detailed consideration of data privacy
regulations in general and the GDPR in particular.
Intervention strategies: In cycle 2, we thus
encouraged the BAMF to analyze its prototype
solution from a legal perspective. The BAMF again
heeded our advice and sought external legal advice on
the prototype from a renowned professor in the area of
blockchain and data protection.
Reflection: From the legal analysis, it became
evident that the prototype complied with data
exchange regulation yet did not comply with the
GDPR as the use of the AZR ID made all data on the
blockchain personal data. However, the legal opinion
indicated that a pseudonymization solution would
resolve this problem.

4.3. Cycle 3: Design of a GDPR-compliant
architecture
Problem: Because of the novelty of both the GDPR
and blockchain, the BAMF could not resort to a best
practice approach when designing a pseudonymization
solution.
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Intervention strategies: In order to mitigate the
lack of best practices, we held several ideation and
architectural refinement workshops. Moreover, the
BAMF met with Germany’s Federal Commissioner
for Data Protection and Freedom of Information
(BfDI). In a two-day workshop, the BAMF and
experts from the BfDI discussed the prototype and
how it could be made to comply with the GDPR.
These two measures lead to two essential
modifications of the prototype’s architecture:
One, the BAMF extended the adapter layer with a
privacy service. This highly secure service maps
pseudonymous Blockchain-IDs to the IDs used in the
existing systems and repositories. Importantly, each
authority has its own privacy service. Mapping
information can be exchanged between privacy
services to allow the receiving authority to attribute
process updates.
Two, the project team developed a rectification and
erasure concept. When rectification of on-chain data is
required, the competent authority can submit a
rectification transaction to the blockchain. When
erasure of the on-chain data is required, for instance,
because of time limits placed on the storage of
personal data, the authorities can delete the mapping
in the privacy service, meaning they can no longer
identify the respective pseudonymous blockchain ID.
In other words, the on-chain data is not deleted, but it
is depersonalized.
Reflection: In the course of cycle three, the BAMF
developed a fully functional pseudonymization
solution.

4.4. Blockchain system architecture
Figure 2 illustrates a schematic view of the final
GDPR-compliant architecture.
The architecture has three layers. Layer one
represents the databases and workflow management
systems of the participants of the blockchain network.
Layer two, the adapter layer, holds the blockchain
adapters and privacy services. The blockchain
adapters connect the databases and systems on layer
one to the blockchain on layer three. They control the
submission of status updates to the blockchain. The
privacy services map the authorities’ specific
identifiers to the pseudonymous identifiers used on the
blockchain. Layer three holds the blockchain with the
events. Similar to the prototype, each event has a
status, a time-stamp, the ID of the authority that
created the status update, and a pseudonymous ID that
allows for the identification of asylum seekers only in
conjunction with the privacy service.

ID
Status x

ID
Status x

ID
Status x

ID
Status x

ID
Status x

Blockchain

Privacy Service

Privacy Service

Blockchain Adapter

Blockchain Adapter

Database

Database

BAMF

LDS

Figure 2. Schematic view of the GDPR-compliant
architecture of the BAMF’s blockchain solution

Technically speaking, the BAMF uses a Hyperledger
Fabric blockchain and standardized interfaces (e.g.,
REST or Web3J) to connect the layers.

5. Design principles for GDPR-compliant
blockchain design
Legally, blockchain solutions can be reconciled
with the GDPR through a “central authority”, a
“shared responsibility”, or a “pseudonymization”
approach. In practical terms, the pseudonymization
option may often be preferable as it seeks to observe
the right to erasure through technical means, rather
than to use a set of voidable contracts. However, this
option requires significant design considerations. In
the guidance we offered the BAMF, we identified two
tentative design principles that can aid these
considerations:
Design Principle 1: Do not store personal data on
a blockchain
Blockchain’s paradigm of tamper-resistant storage
seems to jar profoundly with the right to rectification
and erasure. As such, we encourage blockchain
solution architects to keep personal data off-chain.
Solutions exist in which tampering approaches would
allow for the deletion of data stored on the blockchain
layer [12]. Such an approach, however, would betray
the idea of tamper-resistant storage. Consequently,
this design principle may encourage the creation of a
B2B blockchain network that does not process
personal data – neither of the participants of the
network nor of third parties.
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Design Principle 2: If a use case requires that data
on the blockchain be attributable to a natural person,
use a highly secure off-chain mapping architecture.
Certain use cases, such as the one we explored with
the BAMF, require that information propagated and
stored on the blockchain can be attributed to a natural
person. As Design Principle 1 also applies in these use
cases, the information on the blockchain must not
allow attribution without further information, and
blockchain solution architects should employ a
pseudonymization solution [12]. The information
required for attribution, such as a mapping of abstract
blockchain IDs with specific IDs, has to remain offchain and should be propagated using secure
information channels. With such a solution, data
controllers can “rectify”, through the propagation of
rectification transactions, and they can “erase”,
through the deletion of the information required for
attribution.

6. Conclusion
Centralized workflow management systems
increase efficiency and reduce cost in contexts that
permit centralized workflow governance. However,
such systems are impractical in cross-organizational
settings which prevent the delegation of workflow
governance to a central authority. Blockchain-based
solutions could be a promising alternative in these
settings because they emphasize decentralized
governance. However, the reconciliation of
blockchain-based solutions with the GDPR is a
significant challenge.
In this paper, we discuss how the BAMF realized
this reconciliation. Moreover, we detail the GDRPcompliant solution that the BAMF developed for the
German asylum procedure and present two actionable
design principles for GDPR-compliant design of
blockchain solutions in the area of crossorganizational workflow management.
From a practical angle, our study illustrates how
blockchain solutions can meet the requirements of the
GDPR. From a theoretical angle, we contribute to the
growing field of IS research on the management of
data privacy requirements [6, 35].
Naturally, the BAMF’s architecture may not be the
best solution in other contexts. Moreover, many
elements of the architecture have yet to demonstrate
their suitability for large-scale deployment beyond the
two authorities involved in the BAMF’s pilot setting.
We also caution against viewing the architecture as a
stand-alone solution. It requires complementary
organizational measures, such as the creation of an
arrangement on the division of responsibilities among

the joint controllers to establish full compliance with
the GDPR.
In sum, our study supports the argument that
blockchain and the GDPR are not jarring opposites,
and that we should continue the exploration and
development of blockchain-based solutions for crossorganizational workflow managment. The next
essential step in this journey will be to establish
standards and reference architectures that ensure the
interoperability of various blockchain technologies
and solutions.
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